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TSUNAMI SWAMPS AID AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY: GOVERNMENT
WAIVES REQUIREMENTS
Dr Anne Abraham
University of Wollongong
Following the devastating tsunamis of 26 December 2004, Australians were eager to
donate money to the relief effort. An issue for many was identifying a trustworthy
agency; this could be done through direct knowledge of an organisation, or by
depending on a the recommendations of a source whose competence and integrity was
readily accepted. The Australian government provided this external credibility to the
34 charities it listed on its official tsunami assistance website. However, an
investigation of these agencies and the actual appeals conducted by them, indicates
that the Government may have waived its normal requirements by moving away from
its two accountability programs, AusAID and ACFID accreditation.
INTRODUCTION
On 26 December 2004 a massive earthquake in the Indian Ocean off the northern
Indonesian island of Sumatra caused a series of tsunamis across the Bay of Bengal,
taking more than 230,000 lives and destroying villages, towns and livelihoods in
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, India, the Maldives, Malaysia, Myanmar, the
Seychelles, Bangladesh, Kenya and Somalia.
By 5 January, 10 days after the tsunamis struck, Australians had donated $100 million
towards the relief effort. ABC Online (2005b) reported that “the world is beginning its
biggest-ever aid effort to help millions of victims of the Asian tsunami. Australians
who wish to assist can donate to appeals launched by Australian aid agencies.
Agencies are seeking cash donations to enable them to locally source food, medicine
and shelter.” However, potential donors needed to be aware that not all post-tsunami
appeals for help were genuine since “scammers often ride current affairs to add
legitimacy to their plea” (Maslog-Levis 2005b, p. 2). As with the scam attempts that
surfaced after the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, the
tsunami’s devastation, according to research analyst Jonathan Penn, “is a good
opportunity for the criminals out for a quick buck, and it’s something that people are
going to respond to” (Reuters 2005). In the face of a number of fraudulent
collections,1 Australian donors wanted to know to whom they could donate with
certainty that their money would reach those affected.
In normal circumstances, potential donors may rely on the antecedents of commitment
and trust (Morgan and Hunt 1994) to determine the agencies to which they would
donate. However, in a crisis situation, this trust be may be transferred to a third party
perceived to be trustworthy because of a belief in its competence and integrity (Boyd
2003) and, subsequently, to the collection agencies it recommends. This occurred in
the case of the Australian government, which established a “Tsunami Assistance”
website to provide information for potential donors on how to help. The website
stated: “The Australian Government is working closely with domestic and
international aid agencies to respond to the magnitude of the December 2004
Tsunami. It welcomes the generous level of cooperation which has been extended and

the donations which have been made to various appeals. The most effective form of
assistance which can be offered by members of the public wishing to help is a cash
donation to the charity of their choice” (COA 2005a).
This was followed by a list of 29 hyperlinks which was enlarged a few days later to
include 342 hyperlinks to the aid agencies shown in Table 1 (COA 2005b). However,
there was no indication of how these agencies were selected, beyond the statement
that they had launched appeals. Nevertheless, the public acceptability of these
organisations was emphasised by the statement that “we advise people raising money
to arrange with one of the larger and already approved funds to collect money on their
behalf. The larger funds would be able to supply receipt books and they already have
the various prudential controls in place” (COA 2005a).
TABLE 1: AID AGENCIES LISTED ON OFFICIAL AUSTRALIAN
GOVERNMENT TSUNAMI ASSISTANCE WEBSITE
(as at 25 January 2005)
ADRA Australia
International Fund for Animal Welfare
Anglicord
Medecins Sans Frontieres Australia
Archbishop's Appeal Unit Tsunami
Muslim Aid Australia
Appeal
Austcare
National Council of Churches in Australia
Assisi Aid Projects
Opportunity International Australia
Australia for UNHCR
Oxfam - Community Aid Abroad
Australian Foundation for the Peoples of Plan Australia
Asia and the Pacific
Australian Red Cross
Royal Thai Consulate General Sydney,
Tsunami Appeal
Baptist World Aid Australia
Salvation Army
CARE Australia
Save the Children
Caritas Australia
Sri Lanka Association of NSW
CCF Australia
Sri Lanka Society of Queensland Inc
Christian Blind Mission International
TEAR Australia
Compassion Australia
Thai Disaster Fund Victoria
Forgotten Children Rescue Foundation UNICEF
Friends of the Earth (Australia)
Union Aid Abroad
International Committee of the Red Cross World Vision Australia
This raises the question of the nature of the prudential controls to which the site
referred and how the government knew they were in place. Two Australian
accreditation sources may have provided this assurance — AusAID and the Australian
Council for International Development (ACFID). AusAID was established by the
Australian government to accredit overseas aid agencies and provide the Australian
public with confidence that accredited agencies are “professional, well managed,
community-based organisations that are capable of delivering quality development
outcomes” (COA 2004). ACFID is “the coordinating body for Australian nongovernment overseas aid agencies” which “agree to conduct their activities with
integrity, transparency and accountability” (ACFID 2007).
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Compliance with the ACFID Code of Conduct is monitored by the Code of Conduct
Committee, which consists of an independent chairperson, six representatives elected
from member aid agencies and a representative of donors nominated by the Australian
Consumers' Association. Compliance is monitored by investigation of complaints and
by monitoring of annual reports. Thus, although the code also describes “minimum
fundraising and marketing requirements” to which signatories must conform (ACFID
2004b), observance of these is not checked. However, for donors, compliance with
these requirements may form the basis of trust in the organisations, and be consistent
with Morgan and Hunt's (1994) assertion that trust is present “when one party has
confidence in an exchange partner's reliability and integrity” (Morgan and Hunt 1994,
p. 23). Since trust cannot coexist with guarantees (Nissenbaum 1999), it is necessarily
accompanied by risk (Seligman 1997). However, risk is something over which
donors should be able to maintain control by being able to choose whether to accept it
or avoid donating in the face of excessive risk. Without adequate information, it is
difficult for donors to make this decision. Further, the literature suggests that although
donors support the mission of aid agencies, not all trust the organisations that are
actually carrying out these missions (Robinson 2003). Since “trusters seek evidence of
trustworthiness” (Boyd 2003, p. 399), the development of trust is related to the
demonstration of accountability (Robinson 2003, Sargeant and Lee 2004, Tonkiss and
Passey 1999).
COMMITMENT, TRUST AND ACCOUNTABILITY
At the heart of Morgan and Hunt’s (1994) original commitment-trust model is the
belief that commitment to give is driven by trust and that trust itself is driven by
shared values and communication. They further conceptualised trust in terms of the
organisation's reliability and integrity, concluding that trust is based on the donor's
observed actions of an organisation together with their perceived future behaviour.
Thus, it is important that there is clear communication involving the sharing of
meaningful and timely information (Holdford and White 1997). Indeed, non-profit
organisations must maintain donor trust “in order to raise the funds necessary to fulfil
their missions” (Kelley and Anderson 2006, p. 21) and trust itself is “an outcome of
ongoing processes and practices of accountability” (Roberts 2001, p. 1549).
Non-profit accountability has been defined as “compliance with the institutional
mission” (Sasso 2003, p. 1487) and it has been suggested that aid agencies are
accountable not only to their donors, but also to aid recipients, aid partners and the
general public (Foreman 1999, Churchill 2003, Brown and Moore 2001).
Accountability should focus on both efficiency and results and can be considered at
three distinct levels: fiscal, process and program (Drucker 1992, Quarter and
Richmond 2001, Martin and West 2003, Quarter et al 2003). Fiscal accountability
documents how funds are spent and addresses stewardship issues. Process
accountability focuses on how the agency carries out its stated activities. Program
accountability (which includes social accountability) embraces how the aid is
delivered and to whom. As non-profit organisations demonstrate accountability and
promote standards of excellence in management, “higher trust can only follow” (Light
2002, p. 9).

3

The recent calls for increased non-profit accountability (Maude 1999, Brown and
Moore 2003, Churchill 2003, Kelley and Anderson 2006, Light 2002, Ospina et al
2002, Robinson 2003) have led to the emergence of a number of “watchdog”
organisations which are “rolling out programs to evaluate and accredit nonprofit
groups” (Silverman 2004: D1). The authority and legitimacy of these organisations in
accrediting and monitoring non-profit agencies can be assessed in terms of the
standards they develop and whether these align with generally accepted guidelines for
financial management, control and accountability.
Two independent US watchdog organisations, the Council of Better Business Bureaus
and the National Charities Information Bureau, have established standards addressing
public accountability, fundraising practices and use of donated funds (Howe 2000).
These bodies regularly review non-profit organisations throughout the US and issue
statements indicating the extent of compliance with these standards. Another US
organisation, GuideStar, asserts that “being a good giver takes more than just heart”
(GuideStar 2005) and provides 10 pieces of advice to potential donors. In relation to
accountability, GuideStar declares that “a reputable organization will define its
mission and programs clearly, have measurable goals and use concrete criteria to
describe its achievements”. Similarly, the Evangelical Council for Financial
Accountability (ECFA) states that “good charities willingly answer tough questions”
(ECFA 2005b) and claims that while all non-profit organisations believe in
accountability, ECFA is able to provide assurance to potential donors, because its
members “have acted upon that belief by voluntarily submitting to the ECFA
Standards of Responsible Stewardship and demonstrating their compliance through an
annual review process” (ECFA 2005a).
As previously indicated, two bodies in Australia provide accreditation of aid agencies
— AusAID and ACFID. AusAID accreditation by the Australian government “acts as
a front-end risk management process and ensures accountable use of funding” (COA
2007). It is undertaken by a team consisting of a financial systems assessor and two
independent development consultants contracted by AusAID who assess the agency
against agreed accreditation criteria to determine whether it “has the minimum
necessary and sufficient financial systems to manage Commonwealth funds
effectively” (COA 2007).
One criteria for AusAID accreditation is being a signatory to ACFID’s code of
conduct (ACFID 2005a), thus providing ACFID with the authority and legitimacy of
the Australian Government.
This code “defines standards of governance,
management, financial control and reporting with which non-government
development organisations (NGDOs) should comply. It identifies mechanisms to
ensure accountability in NGDO use of public monies. The Code aims to maintain and
enhance standards throughout the NGDO community, ensuring public confidence in:
the integrity of individuals and organisations comprising the NGDO community; and
quality and effectiveness of NGDO programs” (ACFID 2004a, p. 1).
It was suggested that donors to the tsunami appeal “should ensure that money goes
only to those agencies committed to complying with the Australian Council for
International Development’s [ACFID] code of ethics” (Matheson 2005). Similarly,
Graham Tupper, chief executive of ACFID, told The Australian that “the best way to
avoid frauds was to give to recognised charities which were listed on the ACFID
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website” (Granger 2005). In addition, Myles McGregor-Lowndes, director of
Queensland University of Technology’s Centre for Philanthropy and Non-Profit
Studies, was able to assure The Courier-Mail that “Australia’s overseas aid
organisations are up there with the best — if not the best — for having safeguards in
place. The level of accountability and scrutiny is pretty enormous” (Thomas and
Thompson 2005).
This gives rise to two issues. The first issue is whether the aid agencies which were
given implicit approval by the Australian government as a consequence of being
included in their list on the official tsunami website were accredited by ACFID, thus
providing potential donors with a basis for trust (Boyd 2003, MacMillan et al 2005).
The second issue is whether the agencies actually complied with the requirements of
the ACFID code. These issues provide the basis for the research questions in this
study.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Membership of ACFID provides initial credibility for an aid agency. Further
accreditation is necessary for agencies to receive AusAID NGO status, thus providing
additional evidence of appropriate risk management strategies and accountability
processes. The study investigates whether an agency is a member of ACFID and also
whether it is an accredited AusAID organisation by asking the questions:
RQ 1a: Did the agency have ACFID accreditation?
RQ 1b: Did the agency have AusAID accreditation?
Section 5.5 of the ACFID Code of Conduct requires: “Donations shall be used as
promised or implied in fundraising appeals or as requested by the donor. When
funding is invited from the general public for a specific purpose, the Organisation
shall have a plan for handling any excess and shall make this known as part of the
appeal” (ACFID 2004a, p. 4).
From this arise two questions:
RQ 2: Did the agency provide details of the projects for which the donations would be
used?
RQ 3: Did the agency indicate where excess donations would be channelled once the
projects or programs have been accomplished?
Addressing this section of the code, ACFID’s Graham Tupper stated that “donors
have a right to know how the money is spent” (Thomas and Thompson 2005), so the
fourth research question is:
RQ 4: Did the agency specify the percentage of total donations that will actually go
overseas and the percentage that will be used on administration?
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On 25 January 2005, Oxfam New Zealand released an eight-page brief titled
“Learning the Lessons of the Tsunami — One Month On” which was largely centred
on Oxfam’s work in the tsunami-devastated regions. The brief presented six lessons.
The first of these was that “survivors need appropriate aid, not any aid” and that
“some of the aid provided has not been appropriate” because there is “the need to ask
people what they want” (Oxfam NZ 2005, p. 1). Considering this together with
section 5.1 of the ACFID code which requires organisations to use “reporting
mechanisms which facilitate accountability to members, donors and the general
public” (ACFID 2004a, p. 4), it is important to investigate the nature of aid agency
feedback about the use of the donated funds, which prompts the fifth research
question:
RQ 5: What feedback was provided by the agency?
The easiest way for the general public to source information regarding the financial
and social accountability of aid agencies, particularly in a time of crisis, is through aid
agency websites. Thus this investigation of the research questions is based largely on
a review of these websites as provided through the 34 hyperlinks listed on the
Australian government website. Supplemental information is also drawn from the
AusAID and ACFID websites and from the three financial reports on the tsunami
appeal which were published by ACFID in 2004 and 2005.
RESULTS
RQ 1: ACFID and AusAID accreditation
The list of agencies that appeared on the Australian government’s Tsunami Assistance
website was preceded by the statement: “The most effective form of assistance which
can be offered by members of the public wishing to help is cash donations to the
charity of their choice” (COA 2005a).
The implication for donors is that these organisations all have government approval
and are fitting recipients of their cash. However, many of these agencies do not have
recognised external credibility. The results in Table 2 show that more than one-third
of agencies were not members of ACFID or accredited with the AusAID program.
TABLE 2: ACCREDITATION WITH ACFID AND AUSAID
ACFID
AusAID
n = 34
n =34
Accredited
22
21
Not accredited
12
13
RQ 2: Use of donations
Most agencies specified how they would use the donations raised in the appeal. Three
other agencies, although not specific, explained the nature of the local organisation in
the tsunami-affected areas to which they would be sending the funds. However, two
agencies, Muslim Aid Australia and Royal Thai Consulate-General (Tsunami Appeal)
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made no attempt on their websites to indicate how money would be spent, but merely
asked for donations and provided bank details for deposits.
TABLE 3: INFORMATION REGARDING USE OF DONATIONS BY AID
AGENCIES
ACFID accredited Non- ACFID accredited
n = 22
n = 12
Specific information provided in
21
8
relation to tsunami appeal
Only general areas in which agency
1
2
worked
No information on use of donations
2
RQ 3: Application of excess donations
Only three agencies reported what they would do with any excess funds raised, as
shown in Table 4. One of these, Medecins Sans Frontieres announced that it had put
its tsunami appeal on hold. Having reached its target of $1 million within two days, it
was still accepting donations but would direct them to its general medical aid funds. A
spokesman said: “It is our feeling that to continue accepting donations for the
emergency appeal at this point would violate our ethical standards of transparency and
accountability and indeed our responsibility to our donors” (ABC Online 2005a).This
information was also reported on the agency’s website.
TABLE 4: INFORMATION REGARDING APPLICATION OF EXCESS
DONATIONS
ACFID accredited
Non- ACFID accredited
n = 22
n = 12
Information provided
3
0
No information provided
19
12
Another of the three, ADRA Australia, revealed on its website that “all funds
collected during the tsunami appeal will be used for emergency relief and
rehabilitation projects in tsunami affected areas” and that this was possible because it
had a number of “implementing offices” in tsunami-affected areas which would be
“constantly identifying needs and developing project ideas”. The third agency, Baptist
World Aid Australia, stated: “All funds designated for the Tsunami Relief appeal will
go towards that appeal. As this will be an ongoing project over the next 5 to 10 years,
we do not expect that we will have more money than we need”.
Of the 31 agencies that did not reveal where they would direct excess funds, 12 were
members of ACFID, whose code requires that this information be specifically stated
in an appeal to ensure that all donors know what is happening. One organisation,
World Vision, appeared to realise this omission from its appeal because its
spokesperson, Belinda Richardson, later told The Age (5 January 2005) that they
“could never have enough money for this particular appeal . . . we will never close the
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appeal”. Such belated comments to the press, while laudable, do not meet the
accountability requirements under the ACFID code.
RQ 4: Donations used for disaster relief vs administration
Information about the percentage of the donations that would be applied to disaster
relief was directly provided in the appeals of 10 agencies, as shown in Table 5. A
further six had information elsewhere on their websites about how funds were
generally distributed, but this data was often embedded in layers and not easy to find.
The issue of most concern is that more than half of the agencies did not specify how
the funds would be applied.
TABLE 5: INFORMATION REGARDING USE OF DONATIONS FOR
OVERSEAS DISASTER RELIEF VS. ADMINISTRATION
ACFID accredited Non- ACFID accredited
n = 22
n = 12
Specific information provided in
9
1
relation to tsunami appeal
Only information on general practices
3
3
of the agency
No information provided
10
8
RA 5: Post-tsunami feedback
To assess feedback provided by aid agencies in relation to tsunami donations, their
websites were investigated on three occasions — one month, one year and two years
after the tsunami, the results being summarised in Table 6. Additional sources of data
were the nine-month and two consolidated reports issued by ACFID.
TABLE 6: FEEDBACK PROVIDED ON AGENCY WEBSITES
n = 34
1 month
Information provided on activities in relation to tsunami donations
1 year
Information provided on activities in relation to tsunami donations
Information on distribution of donated funds
Appeal specified as still open (yes) or closed (no)
Hyperlink to ACFID tsunami report
2 years
2005 annual report available on website
Tsunami update — either separately or in annual report
Hyperlink to ACFID tsunami report

Yes
n

No
n

20

14

26
15
5
4

8
19
13
30

21
22
4

13
12
30

If donors revisited websites four weeks after the tsunami to obtain updates on what
had been accomplished with their funds, they would be disappointed. Only 12 of the
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34 organisations provided feedback after 22 January. A further eight had provided
information up until 15 January. Thus, more than 40% of the 34 agencies provided no
feedback to their donors beyond their initial appeal information, with one website
even having closed down.
During 2005 headlines such as “Tsunami Funds Unaccounted For” (McLean 2005),
“Trickle of Tsunami Funds Allocated” (Allard 2005) and “Fees Blunt Tsunami
Donations” (Daily Telegraph 2005) may have raised further concern among donors
and encouraged them to revisit aid agency websites to read updates. A review of the
websites of the 34 agencies one year after the tsunami does little to increase
confidence in the public accountability of these agencies.
Thirty agencies had updated their sites since the end of January, but fewer than half
provided any feedback after 30 June. The summary of the updated reports in Table 6
shows that whereas more than three-quarters of the agencies supplied some
information on the tsunami relief activities in which they had been involved, only 15
of the 34 actually provided details of how they had distributed the donated funds, if
they had indeed done so.
ACFID produced two NGO tsunami accountability reports in 2005, detailing
donations and spending. The first of these (ACFID 2005b), dated 31 March, provided
information from five of its members, and the second (ACFID 2005c), dated 30 June,
provided information from 30 members, 23 of which were included in the 34 aid
agencies on the government tsunami website.3 However, only four of these 23
provided a link to ACFID’s report, making the information readily accessible to
donors who may not have otherwise known of the existence of the reports. ACFID’s
second report indicated that a total of $349.5 million had been donated to these 23
agencies, of which only $102.6 million (or 29.4%) had been spent by 30 June. Given
this large balance still to be spent, donors might believe that tsunami appeals had
closed. Nevertheless, a review of the websites of the 34 aid agencies revealed that five
appeals were still open; no information was provided by 16. Only 13 agencies told
donors that their appeals were closed.
In December 2006, ACFID released a two-year report on the response of Australian
NGOs to the tsunami appeal (ACFID 2006b), providing both a program and a
financial overview. The financial report indicated that $376.6 million had been
donated to the 23 agencies who had been listed on the government website, of which
$233.1 (or 61.9%) had been spent by 30 September 2006, leaving a balance of $143.5
million (or 38.1% of donations) unallocated.
A review of the websites of the 34 agencies revealed that three had been accredited by
ACFID after the appeal was first launched, bringing the total to 25, but only four or
these had supplied a link to the ACFID two-year tsunami report. Twenty-one of the
34 agencies provided their 2005 annual reports on their websites, and 22 presented a
tsunami update either in the annual report or as a separate document. Almost one-third
of the organisations did not provide information to their donors, although most still
had unallocated funds.
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CONCLUSION
Following the 2004 Asian tsunami, potential donors to relief appeals may have looked
for a trustworthy source to recommend appropriate aid agencies with proven track
records of accountability and transparency (Boyd 2003). By establishing a “tsunami
assistance website” with hyperlinks to 34 organisations which had opened appeals, the
Australian government provided these agencies with implicit, if not explicit,
credibility.
This study examined the appropriateness of donors transferring their trust to those
organisations listed on the Australian government website without doing their own
research. The research findings indicate a number of areas in which these agencies
failed to demonstrate the accountability which is at the basis of the development of
trust (Robinson 2003, Tucker 2004). These areas include lack of information about
the way in which the funds would be used, how excess funds would be applied and
the percentage of donations that would actually be spent on aid rather than on
administration. Further, the agencies provided limited feedback to the donors and the
general public.
These results have two immediate implications. The first concerns why these agencies
were selected to be listed on the official website. It would be understandable if the
government had listed agencies which were accredited by ACFID — a body validated
by the fact that its accreditation is a prerequisite for accreditation by the government’s
own AusAID program. But more than one-third of the agencies listed on the website
were not accredited with ACFID. Inquiries about the criteria used to determine this
list were met with no response and the list itself was removed by the end of February
2005. It may be that because the crisis occurred during a holiday period, proper
authority was neither sought nor obtained for the establishment of the website with its
list of hyperlinks. However, given that accredited organisations are listed on the
ACFID website, and that the government has its own list of accredited AusAID
agencies that could have been included, there seems to be no justification for the
composition of the government’s tsunami relief website. The government waived its
normal accountability requirements and provided external credibility to the aid
agencies listed on its official website, implying to donors that these agencies had been
approved by the government. It is disappointing that this happened in a time of crisis
when donors wanted to give but also wanted to know whom they could trust. This
should prompt the government to ensure the existence of appropriate systems and
controls will prevent any recurrence of such a failure.
The second implication relates to monitoring by ACFID. Despite the fact that section
5 of its Code of Conduct specifies fundraising requirements, compliance with these is
not checked. Compliance is monitored only by investigation of complaints and by
examination of annual reports. Yet the ACFID website claims: “The Code offers you
the assurance that a watchdog is monitoring Australian overseas aid and development
agencies. Because the Code demands high standards, you can feel reassured that
organisations are focused on working with integrity and accountability as they support
poor communities around the world. Signatories are required to publicly report on
their financial activities using a standardised format in their Annual Report. This
means it is easy for the public to understand how and where funds are being spent,
and to make comparisons between agencies” (ACFID 2007).

10

The “demands” of a code which are not monitored do nothing to provide assurance to
donors that organisations are trustworthy. In October 2005, ACFID released an
“Emergency Response Checklist” to assist code signatories (ACFID 2006a). The
checklist restated relevant code sections but nothing was done to ensure that
compliance occurs. ACFID may be better employed undertaking random audits of
agencies’ appeals.
Since ACFID monitors annual reports, it is reasonable to assume that all accredited
agencies will produce them, even if they are not available on agency websites. Thus
one area for future research is an analysis of the decision-usefulness of these reports.
However, it is not sufficient for these annual reports merely to disclose financial data
(Quarter et al 2003, FRBR 2005, Weisinger and Salipante 2005). They should include
a broader concept of accountability encompassing social capital (Leonard and Onyx
2005) and aspects of operations including “the people who work for them,
communities that are affected by them or their products, and the use of public goods,
such as infrastructure or education and training” (Dellaportas et al 2005, p. 218), so
that donors can assess whether particular agencies are worthy recipients of their trust
and their money.
NOTES
1 By 4 January, a website was launched in Tasmania complete with the Red Cross
symbol and the logo being used for their Asia Quake and Tsunamis Appeal (Smith
2005). Before the illegal site was taken off the Web, the designer alleged that he had
collected $10,000 which would be forwarded to the Australian Red Cross. However,
another source (Maslog-Levis 2005a) reported that the website had been created in
order to locate an uncle who was missing in Thailand. By 6 January, Australians were
beginning to receive e-mails written in a similar tone to the notorious Nigerian emails (Maslog-Levis 2005b). On 7 January, a Queensland man was charged with
fraudulently collecting tsunami relief funds in three shopping centres while claiming
he was from the Townsville and Brisbane Hospital foundations (ABC Online 2005c).
2 There were 37 organisations listed on the Australian government’s updated
“Tsunami Assistance” website (as at 25 January 2005), but three have been omitted
from the study: ACFID (an accountability watchdog organisation which did not
launch an appeal), Australian Giving Centre (a page with links to organisations) and
Sri Lankan Events Calendar (a page with links to community events held to raise
money for the tsunami appeal). This study investigates the remaining 34 aid agencies.
3 One of the original 34 aid agencies has been accredited by AusAID since the
tsunami appeal was launched, increasing the number from 22 to 23.
REFERENCES
ABC Online, 2005a, “Aid Agency Halts Tsunami Appeal”, online 3 January,
available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200501/s1275568.htm,
accessed 10 January 2005.

11

ABC Online, 2005b, “A Helping Hand”, online 7 January, available at
http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200412/s1273434.htm, accessed 10
January 2005.
ABC Online, 2005c, “Man Held Over Tsunami Fraud Charges”, online 7 January,
available:
http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200501/s1277900.htm,
accessed 10 January 2005.
Allard, T., 2005, “Trickle of Tsunami Funds Allocated after First Meeting”, The
Sydney Morning Herald, 18 March: 8.
Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), 2004a, “ACFID Code of
Conduct for Non Government Development Organisations”, ACFID, Deakin,
ACT.
Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), 2004b, “Code of
Conduct: Fundraising Requirements Checklist”, April, ACFID.
Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), 2005a, “Facts and
Figures”,
available
at
http://www.acfid.asn.au/facts&figures/
establishing_ngo.htm, accessed 10 November 2005.
Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), 2005b, “NGO Tsunami
Accountability Report (26 Dec 04 – 31 Mar 05)”.
Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), 2005c, “Second
Quarterly NGO Report on Asian Tsunami”.
Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), 2006a, “Code of
Conduct:
Emergency
Response
Checklist”,
available
at
http://www.acfid.asn.au/code/
CodeEmergencyResponsechecklist.pdf,
accessed 5 January 2007.
Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), 2006b, “Supporting our
Neighbours: Australians Making a Difference”.
Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), 2007, “ACFID Code of
Conduct”, available at http://www.acfid.asn.au/code/code.htm, accessed 5
January 2007.
Boyd, J., 2003, “The Rhetorical Construction of Trust Online”, Communication
Theory 13, 4: 392–410.
Brown, L.D., and M.H. Moore, 2003, “Accountability, Strategy, and International
Nongovernmental Organizations”,. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly
30, 3: 569–87.
Churchill, N., 2003, “There's a Clear Need for Better Accountability”, Third Sector
288: 15.
Commonwealth of Australia (COA), 2004, “List of Accredited NGOs”, available at
http://www.ausaid.gov.au/ngos/accredited.cfm, accessed 11 December 2004.
Commonwealth of Australia (COA), 2005a, “How to Help”, available at
http://www.tsunamiassist.gov.au/ how_to_help.htm, accessed 10 January
2005.

12

Commonwealth of Australia (COA), 2005b, “Where to Give”, available at
http://www.tsunamiassist.gov.au/ how_to_help/ appeals.htm, accessed 25
January 2005.
Commonwealth of Australia (COA), 2007, “Accreditation for Non-Government
Organisations”, available at http://www.ausaid.gov.au/ngos/accreditation.cfm,
accessed 5 January 2007.
Daily Telegraph, 2005, “Fees Blunt Tsunami Donations”, 3 May: 7.
Dellaportas, S., K. Gibson, R. Alagiah, M. Hutchison, P. Leung, and D. van Homrigh,
2005, Ethics, Governance and Accountability, John Wiley and Sons, Milton,
Qld.
Drucker, P.F., 1992, Managing the Non-profit Organization, HarperBusiness, New
York.
Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability (ECFA), 2005a. “Choosing a
Ministry to Support”, available at http://www.ecfa.org/ContentEngine.aspx?
Page=DonorBOR, accessed 26 January 2005.
Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability (ECFA), 2005b, “The Donor's Bill
of Rights”, available at http://www.ecfa.org/ContentEngine.aspx?Page=
ChooseMinistryIntro, accessed 26 January 2005.
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (FRBR), 2005, “Nonprofit Accountability”,
available at http://www.rich.frb.org/cao/reports/nonprofit.html, accessed 26
January 2005.
Foreman, K., 1999, “Evolving Global Structures and the Challenges Facing
International Relief and Development Organizations”, Nonprofit and
Voluntary Sector Quarterly 28, 4 Supplement: 178–97.
Granger, J., 2005, “Probe on Appeal Website”, The Australian, 3 January: 2.
GuideStar, 2005, “Being a Good Giver Takes More Than Just Heart”, available at
http://www.guidestar.org/learn/index.jsp, accessed 26 January 2005.
Holdford, D., and S. White, 1997, “Testing Commitment-Trust Theory in
Relationships Between Pharmacy Schools and Students”, American Journal of
Pharmaceutical Education 61, Fall: 249–56.
Howe, F., 2000, “The Board Member’s First Duty: Accountability”, Nonprofit World
18, 6:13–18.
Kelley, C.L., and S. Anderson, 2006, “Advising Nonprofit Organisations”, The CPA
Journal 76, 8: 20–6.
Leonard, R., and J. Onyx, 2004, Social Capital and Community Building: Spinning
Straw into Gold, Janus Publishing Company Ltd, London.
Light, P., 2002, “Rebuilding Trust in Charity”, Christian Science Monitor, 16 May: 9.
MacMillan, K., K. Money, A. Money and S. Downing, 2005, “Relationship
Marketing in the Not-for-profit Sector: An Extension and Application of the
Commitment-Trust Theory, Journal of Business Research, 58: 806-808.
Martin, S.W., and E.N. West, 2003, Today's Essentials of Governmental and Not-forProfit Accounting and Reporting, Thomson South-Western, Mason, Ohio.

13

Maslog-Levis, K., 2005a, “Tsunami Donations Web Site Author Escapes Charges”, 4
January,
availableat
http://www.zdnet.com.au/news/communications
/0,2000061791,39176159,00.htm, accessed 11 January 2005.
Maslog-Levis, K., 2005b, “Tsunami Sweeps Dodgy E-mails in to Aussie Shores”, 6
January,
available
at
http://www.zdnet.com.au/news/security/0%
2C2000061744%2C39176317%2C00.htm, accessed 11 January 2005.
Matheson, A., 2005, “Letters to the Editor”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 11 January.
Maude, M.R., 1999, “On Accountability”, Fund Raising Management 30, 4: 36–7.
McLean, T., 2005, “Tsunami Funds Unaccounted For: UN Expert”, AAP Bulletins, 22
February.
Morgan, R.M., and S.D. Hunt, 1994, “the Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship
Marketing”, Journal of Marketing 58: 20–38.
Nissenbaum, H., 1999, “Can Trust be Secured Online? A Theoretical Perspective”,
Etica e Politica 1: 1-15.
Ospina, S., W. Diaz and J.F. O’Sullivan, 2002, “Negotiating Accountability:
Managerial Lessons from Identity-Based Nonprofit Organizations”, Nonprofit
and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 31, 1: 5–31.
Oxfam New Zealand (Oxfam NZ), 2005, “Learning the Lessons of the Tsunami —
One Month On”, available at http://www.oxfam.org.nz/media/05_jan_26
_learnlesson.htm, accessed 27 January 2005.
Quarter, J., and B.J. Richmond, 2001, “Accounting for Social Value in Nonprofits and
For-profits”, Nonprofit Management and Leadership 12, 1: 75–85.
Quarter, J., L. Moko, and B.J. Richmond, 2003, What Counts: Social Accounting for
Nonprofits and Cooperatives, Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey.
Reuters, 2005, “Online Scams Emerge in Tsunami's Wake”, 5 January, available at
http://news.com.com/Online+scams+emerge+in+tsunamis+wake/21007350_3-5514080.html, accessed 11 January 2005.
Roberts, J., 2001, “Trust and Control in Anglo-American Systems of Corporate
Governance: The Individualizing and Socializing Effects of Processes of
Accountability”, Human Relations 54, 12:1547–72.
Robinson, J.H., 2003, “How Can You Gain Your Donors' Trust?”, Nonprofit World
21, 5: 23.
Sargeant, A., and S. Lee, 2004, “Donor Trust and Relationship Commitment in the
U.K. Charity Sector: The Impact on Behavior”, Nonprofit and Voluntary
Sector Quarterly 33, 2: 185–202.
Sasso, P., 2003, “Searching for Trust in the Not-for-profit Boardroom: Looking
Beyond the Duty of Obedience to Ensure Accountability”, UCLA Law Review
50, 6:1485–1546.
Seligman, A.B., 1997, The Problem of Trust, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
New Jersey.
Silverman, R.E., 2004, “Charities Start to Grade Themselves; In bid to Boost Image,
Groups Create Monitoring Programs and Grant 'Seals of Approval'”, The Wall
Street Journal, 18 August: D1.
14

Smith, B., 2005, “Hoaxers Emerge to Add to the Misery” The Age, 4 January: 11.
The Age, 2005, “Australian Donations Surpass $100”, 5 January: 4.
Thomas, H., and T. Thompson, 2005, “Agencies Mend Links in Money Chain”, 8
January,
available
at
http://www.couriermail.news.com.au/common/
story_page/0%2C5936%2C11881504%255E953%2C00.html, accessed 11
January 2005.
Tonkiss, F., and A. Passey, 1999, “Trust, Confidence and Voluntary Organizations:
Between Values and Institutions, Sociology 33, 2: 257–74.
Tucker, A., 2004, “The Role of Reflexive Trust in Modernising Public
Administrations”, Public Performance and Management Review 28, 1: 53–62.
Weisinger, J.Y., and P.F. Salipante, 2005, “A Grounded Theory for Building
Ethnically Bridging Social Capital in Voluntary Organizations”, Nonprofit and
Voluntary Sector Quarterly 34, 1: 29–55.

15

